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Abstract. The knowledge of the different types of emergence is essential if we want to 
understand and master complex systems in science and engineering, respectively. This 
paper specifies a universal taxonomy and comprehensive classification of the major types 
and forms of emergence in Multi-Agent Systems, from simple types of intentional and 
predictable emergence in machines to more complex forms of weak, multiple and strong 
emergence. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The emergence of order and organization in systems 
composed of many autonomous entities or agents is a 
very fundamental process. The process of emergence 
deals with the fundamental question: “how does an entity 
come into existence?” In a process of emergence we 
observe something (for instance the appearance of order 
or organization) and ask how this is possible, since we 
assume causality: every effect should have a cause. The 
surprising aspect in a process of emergence is the 
observation of an effect without an apparent cause. 
Although the process of emergence might look 
mysterious, there is nothing mystical, magical or 
unscientific about it. 
 
If we consider the world of emergent properties, 
the deepest mysteries are as close as the nearest 
seedling, ice cube, grain of salt or pile of sand, as 
Laughlin explains in his book [Laughlin05]. It is 
doubtful that the ultimate laws can be found at 
inconceivable high energies or extreme scales, if 
we do not understand things at our own scale well 
enough. In other words we must step back and look 
at the patterns and the interactions of everyday 
objects to discover the nature of our universe.  
 
Emergent properties are amazing and paradox: they are very fundamental and yet familiar. 
Emergent phenomena in generated systems are according to John H. Holland typically 
persistent patterns with changing components [Holland98], i.e. they are changeless and 
changing, constant and fluctuating, persistent and shifting, inevitable and unpredictable. 
Moreover an emergent property is a part of the system and at the same time it is not a part of 
the system, it depends on a system because it appears in it and is yet independent from it to a 
certain degree. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “emergent entities 
(properties or substances) ‘arise’ out of more fundamental entities and yet are ‘novel’ or 
‘irreducible’ with respect to them”1. Because true emergent properties are irreducible, they 
can not be destroyed or decomposed – they appear or disappear instead. In this sense they 
may seem to be indestructible and are potentially the only things that really exist, but if they 
are examined too closely - if we take a deeper 
look at the components of the system - they do 
not exist at all and often vanish into nothing. 
The paradoxes arises mainly because we are 
often only able to see a part of a complex 
system, if we consider only the microscopic or 
the macroscopic level, but not both at once, or if 
we see only the system or the environment, but 
not both. It is difficult to comprehend a complex 
system with multiple levels and scales.  
 
Unforeseeable failures and unexpected faults in software and hardware systems are a special, 
undesirable form of emergence. As Duncan J. Watts says “the best maintenance procedures in 
the world can't guarantee to prevent faults that aren't yet known to exist [...] failure will 
happen despite our best efforts” [Watts03]. It is necessary to understand the process of 
emergence in complex systems in order to create new forms of complex and robust systems, 
which are prepared for the occurrence of errors and prevent failure as much as possible. The 
knowledge of the different types of emergence is essential if we want to understand and 
master complex systems in science and engineering, respectively.  
 
Self-organization among social animals usually 
involves an emergence ‘trick’: the pheromone 
trick (mark items of interest with a pheromone 
field) and the flocking trick (stay near the 
group but not too close to your neighbours). 
These two simple tricks lead to colonies of 
ants, piles of termites, swarms of bees, flocks 
of birds, herds of mammals, shoals/schools of 
fish, and packs of wolves. Are there other tricks 
or is this the end of it?  
 
A clear formal description would be helpful to answer this question. Aleš Kubík [Kubik03] 
and Yaneer Bar-Yam [BarYam04] tried to do this with grammars, formal languages and 
mathematics. Yet the term “emergence” is too general to cover it with a jargon of a certain 
science: “it is unlikely that a topic as complicated as emergence will submit meekly to a 
concise definition” [Holland98]. Emergence is hard to capture with a model or a theory, just 
because during an emergence process new and unpredictable entities appear, which are 
governed by their own laws. It is associated with the necessity to define new categories, 
concepts and descriptive terms. The problem is as Robert I. Damper argues “How will we 
avoid doing this afresh for each and every case?” [Damper00]. 
 
Since formal descriptions with grammars, formal languages or mathematics are apparently 
inappropriate and unsuitable to solve this difficult problem, at least a complete taxonomy or 
systematic classification would be helpful. This paper is an attempt to propose a standard 
classification, specification and taxonomy for the different types and forms of emergence.  
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Emergence is paradox: emergent 
properties are often changeless and 
changing, constant and fluctuating, 
persistent and shifting, inevitable 
and unpredictable, dependent and 
independent from the system in 
which they arise. 
 2. Definitions and Attributes 
2.1 Definitions 
Since emergence is an ambiguous word, it is important to start with a clear definition. In the 
following, emergent and emergence are defined like this: a property of a system is emergent, 
if it is not a property of any fundamental element, and emergence is the appearance of 
emergent properties and structures on a higher level of organization or complexity (if “more is 
different” [Anderson72]). This is the common definition that can be found in many 
introductory text books on complex systems [Flake00, BarYam97]. 
 
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy [Honderich95] defines emergent properties as 
unpredictable and irreducible: “a property of a complex system is said to be ‘emergent’ just in 
case, although it arises out of the properties and relations characterizing its simpler 
constituents, it is neither predictable from, nor reducible to, these lower-level characteristics”.  
 
The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy [Audi95] distinguishes between structures and laws, 
between descriptive and explanatory emergence.  Descriptive emergence means “there are 
properties of ‘wholes’ (or more complex situations) that cannot be defined through the 
properties of the ‘parts’ (or simpler situations)”. Explanatory emergence means “the laws of 
the more complex situations in the system are not deducible by way of any composition laws 
or laws of coexistence from the laws of the simpler or simplest situations”. 
 
The Cambridge Online Dictionaries2 say to emerge means “to appear by coming out of 
something or out from behind something” or “to come to the end of a difficult period or 
experience”, whereas emergence is simply “the process of appearing”. The words emergence 
and to emerge have the Latin origin emergere which means to rise up out of the water, to 
appear and to arrive. The Latin verb emergere comes from e(x) “out” + mergere  “to dip, 
plunge into liquid, immerse, sink, overwhelm”, i.e. to emerge is something like the opposite 
of to merge. Emergence is derived from the present participle of emergere, emergens. 
Whereas merging means the combination, immersion, fusion of two separate things, emerging 
means the opposite.  
2.2 Attributes and Criteria 
The concepts of explanation, reduction, prediction and causation are central to a deeper 
understanding of emergence [Kim99]. Important characteristics of emergent properties are 
“unexplainability”, “irreducibility”, unpredictability and feedback, although the degrees in 
different systems vary. Francis Heylighen has proposed the following classification criteria 
for emergence [Heylighen91] 
 
 amount of variety in the created system  
      (i.e. in the possible states of the emergent system) 
 amount of external influence (during the process of emergence) 
 type of constraint maintaining the system's identity (absolute or contingent) 
 number of levels, multi-level emergence (one level, two levels, or multiple levels) 
 
This attributes are unfortunately not completely independent: a multi-level emergence process 
has certainly a much higher variety than an emergence process on a single level. 
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3. Classifications and Taxonomies 
3.1 Philosophical Taxonomies  
David J. Chalmers distinguishes between weak and strong emergence [Chalmers02]. His 
strong emergence is not deducible even in principle from the laws of the low-level domain, 
while weak emergence is only unexpected given the properties and principles of the low-level 
domain. Mark A. Bedau distinguishes between three kinds of emergence: nominal, weak and 
strong [Bedau02]. He uses weak and strong in the same sense as Chalmers, and adds the notion 
of nominal emergence, which corresponds to the general definition of an emergent property 
above: nominal emergence is the appearance of a macro property in a system that cannot be a 
micro property.  William Seager [SeagerDrafts] emphasizes two kind of emergence: benign 
and radical. He distinguishes between supposedly ‘benign’ or acceptable emergence - if we 
can find a descriptive or explanatory scheme which provides a useful kind of shorthand 
notation for describing the behavior of a system, for example the pressure and temperature of 
a gas - from a ‘radical’ emergence. His radical emergence corresponds roughly to the strong 
emergence of Bedau and Chalmers. 
3.2 Taxonomies for Particles 
Yaneer Bar-Yam [BarYam04] distinguishes between four types of emergence. He gives the 
following short description, which is based on “particles” and “ensembles” rather than agents 
and groups: 
 
 Type A Emergent Behavior (Micro to macro) 
Type 0 (Parts in isolation without positions to whole)  
Type 1 (Parts with positions to whole - weak emergence)  
Type 2 (Ensemble with collective constraint - strong emergence)  
Type 3 (System to environment relational property - strong emergence) 
 Type B Dynamic emergence of new types of systems “new emergent forms” 
 
Type 0 is simply the “parts isolated vs. parts joined” emergence, similar to benign and 
nominal forms. Type 1 and Type 2 correspond roughly to the weak and strong emergence, 
although his notion of strong emergence is a bit idiosyncratic (“A strong emergent property is 
a property of the system that cannot be found in the properties of the system’s parts or in the 
interactions between the parts”). For strong emergence, he emphasizes correctly the existence 
of intermediate components or ensembles between the global level of the system and the local 
level of the agents. Type 3 classifies the emergent behavior of systems which arise out of the 
interaction with the environment. 
 
3.3 Taxonomies for CA 
There are two general classifications or taxonomies for CA, Wolfram’s and Eppstein’s 
classification. Stephen Wolfram’s four CA classes are [Wolfram84] homogeneous (Class I ) 
regular, periodic (Class II), chaotic (Class III) and complex (Class IV). David Eppstein’s 
simpler classification3 was formulated to overcome difficulties with Wolfram’s scheme. He 
proposes three major classes: 
 
 Contraction impossible (negative feedback) 
 Expansion impossible (positive feedback) 
 Both expansion and contraction possible (neg. and pos. feedback) 
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4. Taxonomy 
4.1 A New Taxonomy 
The taxonomy in this paper is based on different feedback types and the overall structure of 
causality or cause-and-effect relationships, which fits perfectly to the classification of 
Eppstein for CA. Causal relations and cause-effect relationships are a natural order for all 
forms and types of emergence, because the 
cause is normally the unclear point in 
emergence: emergence is an effect or event 
where the cause is not immediately visible 
or apparent. A question about a process of 
emergence is always a question of 
causation and causality – the search of a 
hidden cause for an apparent effect. The 
different types of emergence can be 
classified roughly through four types or 
classes.  
 
Type I contains no feedback at all, only 
“feedforward” relationships4. The major 
characteristic of Type II is simple 
feedback: (a) positive or (b) negative. 
Multiple feedbacks, learning and adaptation 
are important for Type III. John H. 
Holland said about emergence in adaptive 
systems: “Any serious study of emergence 
must confront learning” [Holland98].   
Type III appears in very complex systems with many feedback loops or complex adaptive 
systems with intelligent agents. It is the class with a large amount of external influence during 
the process of emergence (the internality/ externality dimension of Heylighen and Bar-Yam’s 
system to environment relational property). Type IV emergence is characterized in the words 
of Heylighen [Heylighen91] by multi-level emergence and a huge amount of variety in the 
created system, i.e. the number of possible states of the emergent system is astronomical due 
to combinatorial explosion. It is the form of emergence which is responsible for structures on 
a higher level of complexity which cannot be reduced, even in principle, to the direct effect of 
the properties and laws of the elementary components.  
 
Stephen Jones has used a similar approach to define a comprehensive taxonomy [Jones02]. 
He uses feedback relations to propose a taxonomy of emergence, and distinguishes between 
first order (only “feedforward” relations), second order (feedback relations), and third order 
(“mutualistic feedback” relations) forms of emergence. Unfortunately, the third category is 
unclear and seems to contain all other cases. Moreover strong emergence seems to be 
completely missing in his taxonomy. He further tries to apply the different feedback forms 
known from cybernetics to differentiate his second category of emergence: his taxonomy 
distinguishes between feedback with error values (in which the output is filtered and limited 
before it is returned to the input) and feedback without error values (in which the pure output 
is returned to the input). This is not a bad idea, but the explanatory power in the case of 
emergence is doubtful. 
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Type I Simple/Nominal Emergence  
               without top-down feedback 
Type Ia Simple Intentional Emergence 
Type Ib Simple Unintentional Emergence 
 
Type II Weak Emergence  
              including top-down feedback 
Type IIa Weak Emergence (Stable) 
Type IIb Weak Emergence (Instable) 
 
Type III Multiple Emergence  
                  with many feedbacks 
Type IIIa. Stripes, Spots, Bubbling   
Type IIIb. Tunneling, Adaptive Emergence  
 
Type IV Strong Emergence 
 
 
4.2 Different perspectives 
The classification can also be seen from a different perspective, if it is specified in terms of 
constrained generating processes or roles:  type I corresponds to fixed roles, type II to 
flexible roles, type III to the appearance of new roles and the disappearance of old ones, type 
IV to the opening of a whole new world of new roles. Another classification possibility is to 
use different levels of prediction: intentional emergence of type I is predictable, weak 
emergence of type II is predictable in principle (though not in every detail), multiple 
emergence of type III is chaotic or not predictable at all, strong emergence of type IV is not 
predictable in principle. 
 
Type Name Roles Frequency Predictability System 
I Nominal or 
Intentional 
fixed  abundant predictable closed, with 
passive entities 
II Weak flexible  frequent predictable  
in principle 
open, with  
active entities  
III Multiple fluctuating 
 
common - 
unusual 
not predictable   
(or chaotic) 
open, with  
multiple levels 
IV Strong new world of 
roles 
rare not predictable 
in principle 
new or many  
systems 
 
Common elements of all types are boundaries, feedbacks and jumps/leaps. As the name 
emergence suggests, the emergence of something is always possible at a clear boundary of a 
system, and usually a jump or leap to a new level occurs. Moreover nearly all interesting 
types of emergence involve some form of feedback and one or more feedback loops: scale-
preserving (peer-to-peer) feedback in Type Ib, scale-crossing (top-down) feedback in Type II, 
and multiple feedbacks in the other types. 
 
Type Boundaries Feedbacks Jump/Leap 
Ia agent-system 
boundary (only  
in one direction) 
no feedback but 
absolute commands 
or constraints  
intended or static 
jump to higher level 
of organization 
I 
Ib agent-agent boundary scale-preserving 
(peer-to-peer) 
feedback 
fluctuations, no jump 
to significant higher 
level of organization 
II II agent-group or agent 
system boundary (in 
both directions) 
scale-crossing (top-
down) feedback, 
positive or negative 
dynamic jump to 
higher level of 
organization 
IIIa agent-group or agent 
system boundary (in 
both directions) 
scale-crossing (top-
down) feedback, 
positive and 
negative 
dynamic jump to 
higher level of 
organization 
III 
IIIb large fitness barriers 
in complex 
evolutionary systems 
multiple feedbacks 
in a system 
quantum leap in 
complex adaptive 
system 
IV IV boundary between 
different evolutionary 
systems, barrier of 
relevance 
all of the above, 
incl. feedback 
between different 
systems 
gateway or quantum 
leap in evolution to 
new (evolutionary) 
system 
5. Examples  
5.1 Type I. Simple Emergence without top-down feedback 
 
5.1 a) Simple Intentional/Nominal Emergence.  
 
The only constrained generating role or top-down process in type Ia is the intentional design 
of a machine: a specific and fixed role is assigned to each part, and this role does not change 
in the course of time. The behavior of each part is always the same, it is independent of the 
other parts' states, the global state of the system and the environment. The function of a 
complicated or designed machine with type Ia emergence is an intended emergent property of 
the controlled and planned interaction of the individual parts and components: 
 
 The function of a machine is an emergent property of its components 
 The function of a software system is an emergent property of the underlying code 
 The semantic information of a sentence is an emergent property of the sounds and 
words in the sentence that depends on how they are arranged 
 
It is typical for emergence in complex systems that new roles are 
assigned to the agents and actors. In this type, no other form of role 
assignment is allowed. An example for a typical role is “explorer”, 
“follower” or “transporter” during foraging in ant colonies. In a computer 
program or in a complicated system, every component and object has 
only a certain well-defined role and is governed by well understood rules. 
Certainly the gears of a watch have a role in the watch that they did not 
have before, but once they are built in, these roles do not change 
anymore.  
 
If the behavior of each part is independent of the other parts' 
states, then the behavior of a machine is deterministic and 
predictable: such a system is according to Ashby [Ashby62]  
‘self-organizing’ in the sense that it changes from ‘parts 
separated’ to ‘parts joined’. Type Ia emergence is typical for 
ordinary machines as clocks or steam engines. Ashby defined a 
machine as follows: “A ‘machine’ is that which behaves in a 
machine-like way, namely, that its internal state, and the state 
of its surroundings, defines uniquely the next state it will go 
to.” [Ashby62]. 
This form of nominal or intentional emergence is not new. It 
has been used for centuries. If we create such a system, we 
have a certain intention, aim or plan. We debug and change 
the system until the function that emerges from the assembly 
of parts and components matches exactly that single purpose. 
Yet intended emergence has a drawback, as we can observe in 
large systems with complete top-down control (for example a 
planned command economy).  
 
A typical drawback of a system with type Ia emergence is brittleness and lack of flexibility or 
adaptability. Well-defined and planned objects are 100% reliable and act always dutiful to 
fulfil their obligations. If there are no redundant components, a defect in a single component 
can bring the entire system to a halt.  
5.1 b) Simple Unintentional Emergence 
 
The statistical quantities and properties of a number of identical particles are an example of 
unspectacular Type Ib emergence (if they depend on a relation of the particles to each other):  
 
 thermodynamic properties like pressure, volume, temperature 
 characteristic path lengths and clustering coefficients in networks 
 emergent physical properties like an avalanche, a wave-front or a slope of a sand-pile 
 
Type Ib emergence appears in a system with many loosely coupled, disorganized and equal 
elements, which possesses certain average properties as temperature or pressure. It can barely 
be called emergence, because it describes the properties of a large number of agents as the 
sum of an average property. An average quantity alone is not an emergent feature. Yet 
statistical quantities which define properties of an aggregation can be regarded as simple 
emergent properties, if they depend on a relation of the particles to each other, i.e. if they do 
not make sense for a single particle. A quantity like pressure can not be applied to a single 
particle, a single grain of sand has no slope, and a single node in a network has no path length. 
Most averages are averages of properties that apply to the pieces (e.g. average salary of PhDs 
in Computer Science) are not an example of type Ib emergence, because they violate the 
notion that a property is emergent only if it applies to the whole and not to the parts. 
 
Even if there is no top-down feedback, there can be a 
simple feedback on the scale of the agents or particles 
similar to a chain reaction or a domino effect: a particle is 
excited, which influences a new particle, then a new 
particle is excited etc. This simple form of scale-
preserving (peer-to-peer) feedback leads to waves, chain-
reactions, cascades, avalanches, etc.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Type II. Weak Emergence including top-down feedback 
 
Type II emergence includes a top-down feedback from the 
macroscopic to the microscopic level. If we consider a Multi Agent 
System (MAS), we can identify various levels of spatial resolution 
(agent-group, entity-system, individual-collective, particle-
swarm…). On the low microscopic level of the agent, many 
individual entities or agents interact locally with each other. This 
interaction results in a new, usually unpredicted pattern which 
appears at a higher level. On the high macroscopic level of the 
group or whole system, we notice unpredicted patterns, structures or 
properties - emergent phenomena - which are not directly specified 
in the interaction laws, and which in turn influence the low-level 
interactions of the entities via a feedback process. 
 
A swarm or shoal of fish for instance is an emergent property which influences the motions of 
each participating animal. It can be explained and described by type II emergence, which is 
also known as weak emergence. M.A. Bedau has defined weak emergence as follows: a 
macroscopic state or property is weakly emergent if it can be derived from the microscopic 
dynamic but only by simulation [Bedau97]. It is predictable in principle, but not in every 
detail. The difficulties in prediction and derivation of weakly emergent properties arises of 
course from the top-down feedback process, which is among philosophers known as 
‘downward causation’ [Bedau02]. In weak emergence, there is no unique direction of 
causality from the microscopic to the macroscopic level as in simple forms of nominal or 
intentional emergence. There are causal relations in both directions. 
 
There are two basic forms of interaction which lead to weak emergence (see [Küppers96]):  
 
 
 
Direct Interaction. The agents or entities of the system interact directly with each other. The 
interactions lead to the formation of groups and clusters, which influence in turn the behavior 
of the agents or entities. The feedback is only possible if the agents can distinguish between 
different scales, for instance microscopic objects have a repulsive effect whereas macroscopic 
objects have an attractive effect. This happens in the flocking trick mentioned earlier (stay 
near the group but not too close to your neighbours). Examples are swarms of bees, flocks of 
birds, herds of mammals, shoals/schools of fish, and packs of wolves. 
 
  
 
 Indirect Interaction. The agents or entities of the system change the state of the total system 
and the environment through their individual behavior. The changes in the environment 
influence in turn the behavior of the agents or entities. The indirect feedback is possible if the 
agents can manipulate the environment through long-
lasting local changes with global and persistent 
effects, as in the pheromone trick mentioned earlier 
(mark items of interest with a pheromone field), or if 
they act nearly synchronously so that the effect of the 
individual actions is multiplied. Examples in natural 
systems are colonies of ants and piles of termites, in 
social systems migration processes. 
 
There are of course also mixtures of both forms. The groups and clusters which arise through 
direct interaction in the first case can influence the state of the environment. In the second 
case, indirect feedback through the environment often leads to reinforcement of group 
formation, esp. in social rituals with synchronous actions which melt a group together.  
 
Additional to direct and indirect forms of interactions and feedbacks, there are two different 
types of weak emergence according to the two different types of possible feedback: negative 
or damping feedback leads to stable forms of weak emergence, positive or amplifying 
feedback results in instable forms as short-lived fads, bubbles and buzz.  
 
5.2 a) Weak Emergence (Stable)                                  
 
Usually the feedback is negative and imposes a constraint on the actions of the agents. Weak 
unintentional emergence of Type IIa is the classic form of emergence which includes bottom-
up influences and top-down feedback from the group or the environment. It is related to 
swarm intelligence, group formation and stigmergy, and to the flocking and the pheromone 
trick mentioned earlier. Examples are  
 
 foraging behavior of ants colonies 
 flocking behavior of fish and birds  
 a liquid or fluid is an emergent property  
      of molecules 
 forms of self-organization in the Internet, for 
example in the World Wide Web (WWW) and 
WIKIPEDIA, in Open-Source projects as 
Linux and Mozilla 
 optimal prices of goods in an economy and 
free markets according to the law of supply 
and demand 
 
 
In stable forms of weak emergence there is a balance between 
exploration, diversity and randomness (through bottom-up 
influences) on the one hand and exploitation, unity and order 
(through top-down constraints) on the other hand. Type IIa 
emergence is based on two levels which are connected by a 
bottom-up and a complementary top-down process.  
 
Diversity and ‘exploration’ arises out of the ‘creative’ bottom-up 
process due to the autonomy of the components and their unique 
contexts. Unity and ‘exploitation’ arises out of the ‘constraining’ 
top-down feedback processes, which imposes a constraint on the 
components or agents — similar to “peer pressure” and forces 
them to adjust their behavior or to occupy a certain role. The 
complex forms of organization that we observe in a system with 
emergent properties are due to a balance of diversity and unity, 
of exploration and exploitation, of ‘creative’ bottom-up process 
and ‘constraining’ top-down feedback. Ants in a swarm explore 
every direction due to their different individual contexts and 
random influences. Yet they have a collective goal and are forced 
to follow their own pheromone trails. Birds in a flock fly in 
different directions to avoid collisions, but at the same time stay 
close together, try to match the neighbors’ velocity and steer to 
the perceived center of the flock.  
 
The World Wide Web (WWW) mirrors the huge diversity of 
the world population. As Flake et. al say, “Millions of 
individuals operating independently and having a variety of 
backgrounds, knowledge, goals, and cultures author the 
information on the Web” [Flake02]. This diversity is balanced 
by the unifying standards and constraints of the W3C and 
other consortiums (HTML, HTTP,etc.). 
 
This form of self-organization can be very powerful, as the 
continuous success of Linux, Mozilla and the Firefox Browser, 
WIKIPEDIA and countless other open and free collaborative projects 
around the world show. WIKIPEDIA relies on the diversity of its 
participants and contributors. It would not work if it should be 
created with a clone army where every participant is exactly 
identical to its peer. Yet there is a unifying force with preserves 
unity: every participant uses the same simple editor and obeys the 
same easy rules. 
 
Optimal pricing of goods in an economy and free markets 
emerges from the interaction of agents obeying the local 
rules of commerce and the law of supply and demand. It is 
based on negative, stabilizing feedback: high demand or 
undersupply of resources cause high prices, high prices in 
turn reduce the demand and increase the resources. Low 
demand or oversupply of resources cause low prices, low 
prices in turn increase the demand and reduce the 
resources. Thus the demand is changed through negative 
feedback until a partial equilibrium is reached. The law of supply and demand assumes that 
the market is perfectly competitive (no actor has enough power to influence the prices 
directly) and that the agents act rationally, which is not always the case. Someone who only 
imitates others does not act rationally, i.e. his actions are not optimal. He will for example pay 
a price which is not adequate or appropriate for a product. 
 
 
5.2 b) Weak Emergence (Instable)                                  
 
Feedback can also be positive. Drug addiction or economic inflation are (negative) examples 
for positive feedback: high wages lead to high product prices, high prices increase the cost of 
living, and high costs of living increase wages. In drug addiction, high doses activate the 
brain’s reward systems and result in repeated consumption, repeated consumption leads to 
habituation which modifies the reward system and leads to even higher doses. 
 
It is well-known that imitation is one of the primary factors influencing the creation of fads, 
fashion cycles, and abrupt collective opinion shifts [MichardBouchaud05, Tassier04]. As 
Duncan Watts has observed [Watts03], our decisions are frequently based on the actions of 
others. Before we have to decide something important (buy a share on a financial market, 
etc.), we often look what other people are doing, we imitate others. Yet it is possible that 
others do the same, and do not really know what to do, either. When everyone is trying to 
make decisions based on the actions of others, collectives may fail to aggregate information, 
and positive feedback loops and mutual reinforcement can appear. For instance short-lived 
fads: if an item is frequently bought, it is regarded as valuable, and if is valuable, many 
consumer will buy it, if they only look what others are doing. If distributed decision making 
fails like in this case, then small fluctuations from equilibrium can lead to giant and dramatic 
effects: buzz, bubbles and short-lived fads, or cascades and fast growing avalanches: 
 
 Bubbles and crashes in stock markets and 
financial markets 
 Fads, crazes and skewed distributions in 
cultural markets 
 Sudden explosions of social unrest (e.g. East 
Germany, Indonesia, Serbia) 
 Changes in previously stable social norms 
 Bandwagon effect 
 Celebrity effect (someone who is famous 
principally for being well-known) 
 Buzz in the news 
 cluster formation in economic and social 
migrations (ghettos, slums) 
 Path-dependent evolution of lock-in states: the VCR / Keyboard / PC / OS market 
 
A trend follower only imitates others instead of really estimating the value of things. He loses 
the contact to reality, just as the bubble that eventually follows, if all others do the same. 
Type IIb emergence is a form of undesirable, negative emergence through positive feedback, 
until the bubble explodes or vanishes due to exponential growth. The price of an explosive 
phase is the following burnout phase: a financial bubble explodes and ends in a crash, a 
cultural fad ends in oversaturation and a political revolution ends often in political 
indifference. 
 
Certain forms of inappropriate buzz in the news are similar to the emergence of bubbles in 
stock markets or short-lived fads. As Steven Johnson reports in his book “Emergence” (see 
chapter 4 in [Johnson02]), media has a tendency for self-amplification. The discussion if you 
should cover certain things in the media (for example in reports about O.J. Simpson, Bill 
Clinton or Princess Di’s death, if the media is involved itself in the case) is a self-coverage 
and leads to positive feedback: self-coverage leads to situations where the coverage of a story 
begets more coverage, because a story is regarded as important if it is frequently covered. 
 The decisions of TV stations what to broadcast are frequently based on the actions of others, 
they often look what other stations are doing. When everyone is trying to make decisions 
based on the actions of others, collectives may fail to aggregate information, and distributed 
decision making does not work. The possibility of a cascade is certainly determined by the 
underlying communication network. Complex scale-free or small-world networks are 
especially vulnerable to cascades, because on the one hand every node is separated from every 
other node only by a few connections, thus information cascades can spread fast. On the other 
hand such a network contains many easily influenceable individuals, because the average 
degree of connectivity is low, much lower than the amount of nodes in the whole network. 
Individuals which are easily influenceable are not the most connected individuals or opinion 
makers. Thus scale-free or small-world networks are especially vulnerable to cascades due to 
collective decision making. 
 
Cluster formation in economic and social migrations (high-tech regions, slums, ghettos) is 
another example of positive feedback. Good locations attract interesting firms, and interesting 
firms make the location better. This is one factor that leads to the emergence of economic 
clusters and high-tech regions like Bangalore or the Silicon Valley.  Poor living conditions in 
a district (increased violence, use of weapons and drugs) lead to migration of the middle class, 
enhanced migration of the middle class can worsen to conditions. This results in the formation 
of slums and ghettos. 
 
This sort of positive feedback process is known in the economy also as “increasing returns”. 
The concept of positive feedbacks and increasing returns in the economy was illustrated well 
by W. Brian Arthur [Arthur90, Arthur94]. VHS tapes, IBM PCs, QWERTY-Keyboards, DOS 
and Microsoft Windows captured the entire market completely through the same path-
dependent positive feedback process. The process is path-dependent, because small 
fluctuations or accidents at the beginning can be reinforced through the positive feedback 
process to large, unpredictable deviations, until they are finally conserved for a long time in 
the resulting frozen lock-in state, where one product dominates and allocates the entire market 
(German Keyboards replace for example Y with Z, they read QWERTZ instead of 
QWERTY). The reason for positive feedback and self-reinforcing mechanisms is again 
imitation: “I need a VHS / IBM PC / DOS / Windows product because everyone else buys / 
has / uses it”.  
 
Positive feedback is probable in markets where imitation is useful, where compatibility and 
data exchange is very important, and where the costs for obtaining, installing and learning to 
use a new technology are high. As W. Brian Arthur noticed [Arthur90] “The parts of the 
economy that are resource-based (agriculture, bulk-goods production, mining) are still for the 
most part subject to diminishing returns (negative, stabilizing feedback)” whereas “The parts 
of the economy that are knowledge-based, on the other hand, are largely subject to increasing 
returns (positive feedback).”. 
5.3 Type III. Multiple Emergence with many feedbacks 
 
5.3 a) Stripes, Spots, Bubbling - Emergence with multiple feedback 
 
Real financial or stock markets, and many pattern formation processes in nature show neither 
pure Type IIa nor Type IIb behavior. They are often based on a combination of both. The idea 
that short-range activation (positive-feedback) coupled to long-range inhibition (negative 
feedback) can cause pattern formation is not new. In the context of chemical reactions, Alan 
Turing published a similar idea already 1952 [Turing52]. Today systems with short-range 
positive-feedback and long-range negative feedback are known as activator-inhibitor 
systems and belong to reaction-diffusion systems.  
 
In reaction-diffusion systems, an activator “auto”-catalyzes its own 
production, but also activates an inhibitor, which diffuses more 
rapidly. For short-ranges the positive feedback prevails, for long-
ranges the negative feedback takes hold. These systems are 
responsible for many types of biological pattern formation 
[Ball99], especially stripes and spots in animals coat patterns 
(leopard spots, jaguar pigments, zebra 
stripes,…) through activating and 
inhibiting melanocytes, cells that 
produce colored pigment [Murray02]. 
The process can also be simulated in 
simple Cellular Automata, for 
example through the rule “add up the 
number of immediate neighbors who 
are white minus 1/10 of the number of white neighbors in 20x20 
blocks to the left and right of its immediate neighbors. If the sum 
is greater than one the cells becomes white, otherwise it becomes 
black”5. 
 
Patterns with spots and rings like the ones on jaguars 
and leopards can be produced by similar rules. 
Another example for short-range positive-feedback 
and long-range negative feedback is the iterated 
Prisoners’ Dilemma on the lattice [NowakMay92]. 
Their evolutionary game consists only two kinds of 
players: those who always cooperate, and those who 
always defect. Every lattice site is occupied by a 
player. In each round, the players play the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma game with their immediate neighbors, and 
the score of the player is the sum of the pay-offs in 
these encounters. At the end of the round (or 
generation), each lattice site is occupied by the player 
with the highest score among the previous owner and 
the neighbors. The result is that networks of 
                                                 
5see http://grace.evergreen.edu/artofcomp/examples/zebra/Zebra.html  A similar example for a discrete version 
or idealization of a reaction-diffusion process is also given by Stephen Wolfram in his NKS book on page 427 
[Wolfram02] 
 
“defectors” and cheaters (red) emerge in a sea of cooperators (blue). Cooperators support and 
reinforce each other, but if the clusters of cooperators grow too large, the conditions for 
defectors are getting better: red cheaters who exploit the cooperators spread and limit the size 
of blue clusters.  
 
Real financial or stock markets show often chaotic und unpredictable behavior, produce 
fractal and multifractal structures, and there are unpredictable runs of successive losses and 
crashes, but also repeated speculative bubbles of all sizes, see for example [Sornette03]. A 
system like the stock market which has both positive and negative feedback mechanisms can 
show oscillating and chaotic behavior.  
 
You can find frequently a combination of short-term positive feedback (blind imitation) and 
long-term negative feedback (careful consideration). When stocks are rising, the belief that 
further rises are probable gives investors, imitators and trend-followers an incentive to buy, 
which will rise the price even more (positive feedback); but eventually the increased price of 
the shares, and the knowledge that there must be finally a peak after which the market will fall 
and prices will drop, ends up deterring buyers (negative feedback). If the stocks are falling the 
process is similar. Once the market begins to fall regularly, some investors may expect further 
declines and refrain from buying (positive feedback), but others may buy because stocks 
become more and more of a bargain (negative feedback). The combination of short-term 
positive feedback and long-term negative feedback leads to “bubbling”, fluctuating or 
turbulent sequences of bubbles. Short-lived bubbles of all sizes appear that rise and expand as 
quickly as they disappear again. A bubble is triggered by a fluctuation or irregularity, It 
expands through positive feedback, and shrinks again through negative feedback.A good 
model for this bubbling behavior is the cellular automata model “Larger than Life”, an 
extension of Conway's Game of Life to a larger radius. The definition of Conway's Game of 
Life is simple: A birth occurs at x if the population within its neighborhood equals 3. Site x 
stays occupied/alive if the 
count is in [2..3]. The “Bugs” 
rule for “Larger than Life” is 
very similar: A birth occurs at 
x if the population within its 
neighborhood (x included or 
not) lies in the interval [34..45] 
(positive feedback). Site x stays 
occupied if the count is in 
[34..58] (negative feedback for 
very small and very large 
values, due to loneliness and 
overpopulation).The 
screenshots made with the CA 
simulator MJCell from Mirek 
Wójtowicz show a series of 
bubbles. 
 
This category IIIa contains also all patterns of the normal “Game of Life”: Blinkers, Gliders, 
Spaceships, etc. In the normal Game of Life from John Conway there are for instance 
spaceships in all different sizes, lightweight, medium or middleweight and heavyweight, 
besides the usual gliders, the most basic “spaceships”. A spaceship moves with light-speed, 
i.e. one pixel or unit per time step. 
 
Light
Spaceship 
Medium 
Spaceship 
Heavy
Spaceship 
Basic
Spaceship 
(Glider)
 
 
All these spaceships look similar, and they propagate vertical or horizontal direction through 
the same mechanism, a repeated contraction and expansion due to coupled positive and 
negative feedback (except the glider which travels in diagonal direction). The mechanism is a 
sort of repeated bubbling, the form of the spaceship can be seen as the border of an expanding 
and contracting bubble. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3 b) Tunneling – Adaptive Emergence with multiple feedback 
 
There are many reasons for the slow or sudden appearance of complexity. If something 
emerges very suddenly or fast, it has for instance often been blocked before by an obstacle or 
barrier, e.g. a jam, a dogma, or barrier or a system border. A large ecosystem consists of 
thousands of species and their corresponding ecological niches and habitats, many of them 
interacting with each other. It usually consists of many different plants, animals, and various 
micro-organisms like bacteria that are linked by a very complex network. If we consider a 
global ecosystem like the earth as a whole, we can notice numerous types of feedbacks and 
constraints which make up together a very complex system. As the history of our Earth 
shows, the evolution of such a system is certainly not a linear, smooth and continuous 
process. It is marked by abrupt, unsteady changes and jumps in complexity. 
 
The different levels of complexity and organization in life forms are associated with 
evolutionary transitions [SmithSzathmáry97]. Evolutionary transitions characterize the 
crossing of large fitness gaps and fitness barriers. Abrupt, unsteady changes and jumps in 
complexity are the consequence of unsteady fitness landscapes and barriers. Evolution waits 
until major events like massive catastrophes break and reduce these fitness barriers or agents 
are able to tunnel through them. Catastrophes act as catalysts, if they accelerate the transition 
to higher forms of complexity through a sudden, dramatic increase of challenges in the 
environment. The tunnelling through fitness barriers is possible through the borrowing of 
Contraction Expansion Contraction
Spaceship Propagation in the Game of Life
Exp.
complexity, similar to the borrowing of energy during a tunnelling process in Quantum 
Theory, see chapter 5.2 and 5.3 in [Fromm04].  
 
This form of emergence in adaptive and evolutionary systems is directly related to (mass) 
extinctions and dramatic or catastrophic events in the environment. Catastrophes in natural 
systems can be comets or asteroid impacts, volcanoes, earthquakes, ice ages, droughts or 
floods. If there are catastrophic events or fluctuations which are unpredictable and neither too 
common nor too rare, then these catastrophes can enhance evolution and accelerate 
adaptation. Therefore this form of emergence can be named adaptive emergence. It is an 
example of type IIIb emergence, and appears in a complex adaptive system (CAS) with 
multiple feedbacks and many constraint generating processes. It is associated with the 
appearance of completely new roles and the dramatic change of already existing “ecological” 
niches.  
 
Type IIIb emergence is also responsible for sudden scientific and mental revolutions. Before 
“mental revolutions” there is usually a mental barrier for new actions or insights – an 
incongruity in meaning or an unconscious censor which inhibits actions. Every new situation 
for a human or an agent is a cognitive puzzle or problem. If it can not be solved at all by 
thinking and reasoning, it can turn out potentially into a catastrophe. Thus every mental 
barrier is like a small cognitive catastrophe, which results in a new insight and an avalanche 
of neural activity (or laughter) if the obstacle is suddenly overcome. The same argument 
applies to scientific revolutions proposed by Thomas Kuhn: a barrier (often caused by the 
constraints of the old theory) prevents the discovery of a new theory, until the obstacle is 
overcome with a new paradigm which results in an avalanche of publications and scientific 
activities, see chapter 6.2 in [Fromm04].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Type IV. Strong Emergence and Supervenience 
 
Strong Emergence can be defined as the appearance of emergent structures on higher levels of 
organization or complexity which possess truly new properties that cannot be reduced, even in 
principle, to the cumulative effect of the properties and laws of the basic parts and elementary 
components. Life is a strong emergent property of genes, genetic code and nucleic/amino 
acids, and Culture in general is a strong emergent property of memes, language and writing 
systems. Contrary to the theories of some philosophers, this definition of strong emergence 
does not have to violate any laws of physics. The term strong emergence is sometimes used to 
describe magic, unscientific or supernatural processes. This is apparently a wrong concept 
which must be modified.  
 
The processes which have been described by strong emergence are not magical, unscientific 
or even anti-scientific. There are no magic or supernatural powers involved, only very 
complex phenomena on multiple scales. Like other forms of emergence it may look magical, 
if you do not understand the inner processes. If you have never heard of DNA and genes, then 
life looks in fact magical. Yet there is a spark of truth in the idea that life can not be explained 
solely by physical processes (“Vitalism”). It is correct that the physical laws can not describe 
biological forms. The laws of particles physics are irrelevant to macroscopic phenomena. 
Microscopic rules are irrelevant compared to the effects of collective organization on 
macroscopic scales. This is the paradox of emergence, which becomes most clearly visible in 
the case of strong emergence. The macroscopic structures and patterns depend on the 
microscopic particles, and yet they are independent from them. This weakest form of causal 
dependence is also circumscribed by the name supervenience. 
 
The macroscopic level is independent from the microscopic level, because there is a 
mesoscopic or intermediate level that protects and isolates the one from the other. Therefore 
in strong emergence the macroscopic level is irrelevant to the microscopic level and vice 
versa. It is like Anderson said: “the ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws 
does not imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe. In fact, the 
more the elementary particles physicists tell us about the nature of fundamental laws, the less 
relevance they seem to have to the very real problems of the rest of science, much less to 
those of society” [Anderson72].  The macroscopic level remains invariant if the micoscopic 
level is replaced by something else, as long as the mesoscopic or intermediate levels remains 
the same. Laughlin calls this the “Barrier of Relevance” in his book in chapter 12 
[Laughlin05].  
 
Strong emergence in this sense is the crossing of the barrier of relevance. It is often related to 
very large jumps in complexity and major evolutionary transitions, which can be 
characterized by the appearance of new replicators (genes, memes, ...) and completely new 
forms of evolution (biological, cultural, ...). The enormous number 10120 - according to Paul 
Davies [Davies04] the Landauer-Wheeler-Lloyd limit - sets a limit to any constraint of over-
determinism that “bottom level” laws of physics might exercise over “higher level”, emergent 
laws, simply due to the problem of combinatorial explosion. The huge number of possible 
combination makes any deterministic algorithm, rule or law impossible. 10120 is an 
astronomical number, which corresponds (very) roughly to the number of bits of information 
that have been processed by all the matter in the universe (if the universe were turned into a 
computer, it could process about 10120  bits of information in the age of the universe, which is 
roughly 14 billion years [Lloyd02]). Even if a deterministic rule or law is very short and 
compressed, it makes no sense if the calculation takes several billion years. This does not 
mean that determinism is completely impossible, it only constraints the determinism of local, 
low-level laws over global, high-level behavior with strong emergent properties of the system. 
Examples where the Landauer-Wheeler-Lloyd limit is reached definitely are the transitions to 
the two basic forms of evolutionary systems (genetic and memetic evolution): 
 
(1) The emergence of life, biological evolution, genes, genetic replicators, genetic code 
Real proteins contain typically between n=60 and n=100 amino acids. The existing 20 amino 
acids can be arranged in 20n different sequences, which comes close to the Landauer-
Wheeler-Lloyd limit of 10120. Since amino acids in proteins are specified by three letter words 
or codons (CCG, UGA, CAA, AUG,..) of nucleotide base pairs, the same 
argument applies to base pairs in genes.  
 
Some say that this is an argument for “intelligent design” and against evolution. Yet evolution 
is able to explore these vast array of possibilities and combinations over a long period of time. 
Due to constant variation through mutation and recombination it checks and abandons a huge 
number of attempts that do not work. The point here is that it is not possible to incorporate the 
behavior of biological organisms (which are based on genes and proteins) somehow into the 
laws of atomic physics. 
 
(2) The emergence of culture, cultural evolution, memes, memetic replicators, language 
Normal alphabetic languages with 26 characters also specify an inconceivable, tremendous 
large number of different combinations. Languages like English have 26 characters, roughly 7 
characters in a word, and about 7 words in a sentence, hence about 2649 
different sequences for a sentence. Not all combinations are valid, though, and there only 
about 100,000 English words. If we consider longer meaningful texts with more than 25 
words, we come again close to the Landauer-Wheeler-Lloyd limit of 10120. Again, this huge 
number of combinations prevents any direct control of low-level biological laws over social 
and cultural phenomena. Neither our languages nor our writing systems are encoded in our 
genes (we know that genes control emotions, and emotions control high-level behavior, but 
this is more an indirect control mechanism). 
 
These two forms are the most important kinds of “emergence”. The first, the origin of life and 
the genetic code, triggered genetic and biological evolution. The second, the origin of culture 
and language, triggered memetic and cultural evolution. The two elementary units of live and 
culture are the cell and the society, respectively. The first is based on genetic code and DNA, 
the second on ordinary language and writing systems. Strong emergence can be seen as a 
transition from one evolutionary system (or complex adaptive system) to another and is 
therefore a kind of breakthrough or gateway event, as Murray Gell-Mann calls it [Gell-
Mann94]. A gateway event opens up whole new realms of possibility. Since strong emergence 
is related to the appearance of a new code, it has the tendency to spawn many different forms 
of weak emergence. Systems (not individual agents) which are the result of strong emergence 
are very complex. The role of emergence in both fields, living cells and changing societies, is 
still an active field of research, see for example [Sawyer05]. 
 
Type IV means up to now the appearance of new evolutionary systems where structures are 
specified by a new language in form of a genetic/memetic code or other alphabet. But in 
principle it can be any system with a set of building blocks and multi-level emergence. An 
example is the simulation of a Turing Machine in the Game of Life. Although it may be 
considered as useless to build a Turing Machine in a CA6, it can serve as a toy-model for 
                                                 
6
 It would take nearly an infinite amount of time and resources to do something useful. It is like traveling around 
the world with a tricycle: awfully slow and not ver
strong emergence, because here the emergent phenomena implement functionality that is 
logically separable from the underlying phenomena that gave rise to it. The Turing Machine 
functionality may be implemented on a platform defined by Game of Life rules, but in any 
other platform as well, and the Computability Theory is not a subset of Game of Life theory – 
if there is such a thing.  
 
In philosophy this is described by the term supervenience, a step before “transcendence”. The 
highest/strongest form of emergence is related to supervenience, the lowest/weakest form of 
causal dependence. In other words the maximal form of emergence is associated with the 
minimal form of causal connection. Supervenient means originally “not part of the real or 
essential nature of a thing”. A “higher-level system X is supervenient on a low-level system 
Y”, if the following holds for all objects a and b: (1) a and b cannot differ in their X-
properties without also differing in Y-properties (2) if a and b have identical Y-properties, 
then they also have identical X-properties. It is often used to explain the brain-mind or body-
soul duality, where X are mental properties and Y are physical properties. 
 
Therefore strong emergence describes systems which are supervenient on the lower ones, but 
logically separable from the underlying phenomena that gave rise to it. “Multiscale” systems 
arising through strong emergence depend on lower systems, because they are implemented at 
the lowest level in their language, but at the same time they are independent from them, since 
they obey their own mesoscopic or macroscopic language and are insensitive to microscopic 
details. The microscopic details of the lower system are completely irrelevant to macroscopic 
phenomena. The higher system could be implemented in other systems as well. 
 
 
TYPE IV
Strong Emergence
TYPE III 
Multiple Emergence 
TYPE II
Weak Emergence
TYPE I
Simple Emergence
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper offers a comprehensive classification for the different types of emergence, which 
are divided into four basic classes: Type I describes simple emergence without top-down 
feedback and self-organization, and includes esp. intentional emergence in complicated 
machines. Type II contains the classic phenomena of weak emergence including top-down 
feedback and self-organization. It is further distinguished between stable and instable forms in 
this class. Type III covers all forms of emergence through multiple feedback and adaptation 
in more complex adaptive systems due to evolution, and finally Type IV characterizes all 
forms of strong emergence in evolution. The term strong emergence is liberated from any 
magical or unscientific meaning.  
 
The proposed classes stay the same if you select predictability instead of feedback as the main 
characteristic class feature: it does not matter whether you consider degrees of predictability, 
types of feedbacks, forms of causality, or the different kinds of constrained generating 
processes or roles. The classification can also be specified in terms of predictability: 
intentional emergence of type I is predictable and corresponds to fixed roles, weak emergence 
of type II is predictable in principle (though not in every detail) and corresponds to flexible 
roles, multiple emergence of type III is often chaotic or not predictable at all, and is 
associated with the appearance of new roles and the disappearance of old ones, whereas 
strong emergence of type IV is not predictable in principle, because it opens up a whole new 
world of new roles. Emergence is a creative, contingent and often unpredictable process: the 
stronger the emergence, the less predictable are the emergent properties, patterns and 
structures. 
 
It is possible that there are other forms of Type III emergence with “multiple feedback” 
which have not been mentioned so far. Systems with many forms of feedback are often very 
complex and not easy too understand. Systems with time-delay feedback can show for 
example chaotic behavior. This is certainly a place to look, if you want to discover new forms 
of emergence. The taxonomy of emergence proposed in this paper is not a comprehensive 
theory, but a first step in the right direction to a deeper and better understanding of the various 
phenomena in complex systems. Just as complexity is hard to define, because something is 
complex if it is difficult to describe, emergence is hard to capture with a model or a theory, 
because during an emergence process new entities appear, which are governed by their own 
laws.  
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